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February 3, 2023

Three events took place recently that have changed my view of an Israeli military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

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For years now, I have answered with caution the warmongers and headline-grabbers who have gleefully touted impending Israeli airstrikes on Iran. I have stated, with reason and facts in support, that Israel has demonstrated repeatedly that it has many ways of slowing down Iran’s nuclear weapons programs short of a kinetic military strike.

Why take the risk of airstrikes, which all the world will see, when you can slow down the program by other means that in addition are difficult to pin on Israel?

For example: for many years, under Mossad director Meir Dagan, Israel carried out targeted assassinations of Iranian nuclear weapon scientists, acts that presumably had a deterrent effect on younger scientists joining the programs.

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Israel collaborated with the United States in inserting computer viruses inside Iran’s uranium-enrichment plants, causing high-speed centrifuges to crash and probably explode, leading to clean-up operations and repairs that set back the program by months and possibly years.

Israel also carried out the most audacious human intelligence operation in the history of modern espionage by locating Iran’s top secret nuclear archive in a nondescript suburb of Tehran, penetrating the building, breaking multiple bank vaults inside, and spiriting away hundreds of boxes of documents that detailed Iran’s lies to UN nuclear inspectors about its intentions. For well over a year, the Iranians had no clue that they had been penetrated — until Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu showed the documents to the world at the UN General Assembly in New York.

But good — even great — intelligence operations have their limits. Great intelligence could never have stopped Hitler’s blitzkrieg into Poland. Once he had the tanks and the troops and had trained them in operations, Hitler could only be met with force.

Last week, we learned from Director General Raphael Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran now has enough 60% enriched uranium to manufacture three or four bombs, should it choose to put that material into the final (and very short) enrichment phase to reach weapons capacity.

For months, unofficial experts, such as former IAEA inspector David Albright, have been warning that Iran was reaching such a threshold. But it’s one thing for a think tank to speculate on official information, with all its gaps. It’s quite another for the source of that information — in this case, the IAEA director — to make such a statement in his official capacity.

In the thirty-five years I have been tracking Iran’s nuclear weapons programs, which I write about in my latest book And the Rest is History: Tales of Hostages, Arms Dealers, Dirty Tricks, and Spies — this is the first time I have heard the IAEA make such a bold statement about Iran. Normally it’s all weasel words and schoomarm warnings to proliferators to mend their ways.