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President Donald Trump said the U.S. would “take” Iran’s enriched uranium if necessary — raising questions about how American forces could physically secure the material after strikes on nuclear sites.
“Iran will not have a nuclear weapon, and we’re going to get the dust back. We’ll get it back. Either we’ll get it back from them or we’ll take it,” Trump said at the White House Monday, referring to Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles.
The comments also come after high-stakes negotiations between the United States and Iran in Pakistan over the weekend ended without a deal, with disputes over uranium enrichment and control of nuclear material at the center of the impasse.
With diplomacy stalled, a key challenge remains: airpower can damage nuclear facilities, but physically locating, securing and removing enriched uranium would require a far more complex operation.
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Iran is believed to possess a significant stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%, near weapons-grade — material that could be further refined for use in nuclear weapons if not brought under control.
Analysts say securing the material itself would likely require forces on the ground.
“If the U.S. wants to secure Iran’s nuclear materials, it’s going to require a massive ground operation,” Kelsey Davenport, director of nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, told Fox News Digital.
Davenport said the highly enriched uranium believed to be stored at Isfahan appears to be deeply buried and contained in relatively mobile canisters. Securing it would likely require locating the full stockpile, accessing underground facilities and safely extracting or downblending the material.
Satellite imagery taken on Jan. 30, 2026, shows a new roof over a previously destroyed building at the Natanz nuclear site. (2026 PLANET LABS PBC/Handout via Reuters)
“It’s not even clear the United States knows where all of the uranium is,” she said, noting that the mobility of storage containers raises the possibility that some material could be moved or dispersed.
But international inspectors say there are no clear indications the material has been relocated from key sites like Isfahan, even as access to the facilities remains limited.
Senior administration officials have argued that Iran sought to build up its ballistic missile arsenal in part to create a deterrent shield — enabling Iran to continue advancing its nuclear program while discouraging outside intervention.
So far, however, the bulk of U.S. strikes have focused on degrading missile launchers, air defenses and other conventional military targets.
Experts note that dismantling missile systems may reduce Iran’s ability to shield a potential nuclear breakout. But physically controlling enriched uranium itself presents a separate and more complex challenge.
This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)
Airstrikes versus physical control
Defense officials have acknowledged that degrading nuclear infrastructure from the air is different from safely managing or securing nuclear material.
Airstrikes can destroy centrifuges, power systems and support buildings. But enriched uranium stored underground may remain intact unless it is physically secured, removed or verifiably downblended.
Striking or extracting nuclear material also carries safety risks that military planners must weigh.
If storage casks containing uranium hexafluoride gas were compromised, the material could pose chemical toxicity risks to personnel entering the site without proper protective equipment. Analysts say a conventional strike is unlikely to trigger a nuclear detonation, but dispersal of material could create localized hazards and complicate recovery efforts.
Chuck DeVore, a former Reagan-era defense official who worked on nuclear issues, argued that directly targeting the stockpile may not be a priority under current battlefield conditions.
“You don’t want to release the material into the surrounding areas and cause radioactive contamination,” DeVore said, adding that deeply buried facilities are difficult to reach from the air.
DeVore also downplayed the immediacy of a breakout scenario, arguing that further enrichment, weaponization and delivery would be difficult to execute undetected amid sustained U.S. air operations.
Even if Iran were able to further enrich uranium, he said, assembling a deliverable weapon under active military pressure would present significant technical and operational hurdles.
Trump said that the United States completed a “very successful” strike against Iranian nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, saying that Iran’s nuclear enrichment installations have been “obliterated.” (Fox News)
Still, DeVore acknowledged that long-term control of the uranium would ultimately require a political resolution inside Iran and some form of outside oversight.
What would securing it require?
Nonproliferation experts say securing enriched uranium generally involves more than military force. It requires verified accounting of the material, sustained access to storage sites and either removal or downblending to lower enrichment levels suitable for civilian use.
Davenport said internationally monitored downblending would be the safest option if political conditions allow.
“The IAEA remains the best place to go back into Iran to monitor the sites, to try to track down and account for the enriched uranium,” she said, describing downblending as a relatively straightforward technical process compared to attempting to extract and transport highly enriched material in a contested environment.
Both pathways — physical seizure or internationally monitored reduction — depend on conditions that do not currently exist.
Administration officials argue that dismantling Iran’s missile network weakens Iran’s ability to shield a nuclear breakout and reduces the immediate threat to U.S. forces and regional allies.
But suppressing missiles and controlling enriched uranium are separate challenges.
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Destroying infrastructure can slow or disrupt a program. Physically locating, accounting for and securing nuclear material requires sustained access, reliable intelligence and — ultimately — political conditions that allow it.
For now, the administration maintains that Iran will not be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon. How the enriched uranium itself would be secured remains a question without a public answer.
